Bibliographical data for
Author
Title of Edited Collection
PPP - Philosophy and Predictive Processing
Editors
Publication Date
March 2017
Publication Place
Frankfurt am Main, Germany
ISBN
9783958573048
Abstract
The notion that the brain is a prediction error minimizer entails, via the notion of Markov blankets and self-evidencing, a form of global scepticism – an inability to rule out evil demon scenarios. This type of scepticism is viewed by some as a sign of a fatally flawed conception of mind and cognition. Here I discuss whether this scepticism is ameliorated by acknowledging the role of action in the most ambitious approach to prediction error minimization, namely under the free energy principle. I argue that the scepticism remains but that the role of action in the free energy principle constrains the demon’s work. This yields new insights about the free energy principle, epistemology, and the place of mind in nature.
Keywords
Scepticism |
Epistemic value |
Prediction error minimization |
Active inference |
Markov blanket |
Interventionism |
Agency |
Internal models |
Self-evidencing |
Perceptual learning |
Approximate bayesian inference |
Variational bayesian inference |
Perceptual inference |
Internalism |
Exact inference |
Evil demon |
Functional role semantics |
Free energy principle |
Coupled oscillation